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This policy brief summarises the main findings and lessons learned from a research on corruption, social norms 
and behaviours in Rwanda. The findings show that, although Rwanda has successfully curbed corruption, 
favouritism continues to be used to secure preferential access to public health services. While the Rwandan 
experience illustrates how behavioural insights can effectively complement conventional anti-corruption 
approaches, further entry areas for deepening behavioural anti-corruption interventions are also identified. 
 
Introduction 
Combatting corruption in the developing world has been a 
formidable challenge and the results and outcomes of 
conventional anti-corruption interventions continue to be 
modest at best, despite the many efforts of the 
international development community. In Rwanda though, 
thanks to the a zero-tolerance approach to corruption 
under the leadership of President Paul Kagame, 
remarkable improvements have been made and 
incidences of petty corruption are nowadays rare. In fact, 
according to leading indicators, Rwanda is one of the 
least corrupt African countries (2016 Transparency 
International’s CPI, World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators).  
In this regard, the potential of incorporating behavioural 
approaches to promote anti-corruption outcomes has 
generated great interest. What distinguishes a behavioural 
perspective from conventional anti-corruption 
prescriptions is the recognition that people often do not 
make “rational” cost-benefit decisions but are 
significantly influenced by social, cultural or other quasi-
rational factors. Behavioural insights could increase the 
effectiveness of development interventions by taking into 
account the way in which local contexts and socio-
cultural structures influence the propensity of individuals 
to engage in corruption. 
Against this backdrop, the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) through its East Africa 
Research Fund (EARF) commissioned the Basel Institute 
on Governance to conduct qualitative research exploring 
the utility of a behavioural approach to tackling petty 
corruption, which in Rwanda was conducted in 
collaboration with the Protestant University of Rwanda. 
This policy brief extracts the main research findings and 
policy lessons learned for the case of Rwanda as one of 
three East African countries under investigation.1  
Main Research Findings 
The research reveals evidence that behavioural drivers 
can play a role in fuelling certain practices of petty 
corruption in Rwanda, particularly in the form of 
favouritism among members of social networks. Overall, 
other practices such as bribery, have become a rather 
rare occurrence. Rwandan health services are usually 
delivered to high standards and accessible for all, 
although few incidences of bribery were reported during 
the ubudehe categorisation and registration processes. In 
contrast, the police sector is still perceived as corrupt by 
research participants who reported incidences of bribery 
among traffic officers.  
                                                      
1 The other countries were Tanzania and Uganda. For more detail, consult the comparative 
and country reports as well as the other two policy briefs associated to the project, 
accessible on www.baselgovernance.org/publications/. 
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Crucial non-behavioural factors that have contributed 
significantly to the remarkable improvements in 
governance and anti-corruption outcomes in Rwanda are 
grounded in the political will linked to the government of 
President Kagame. Under his leadership, anti-corruption 
has been prioritised as reflected in wide-ranging 
institutional reforms and development programmes that 
have successfully been implemented. These reforms have 
made public services accessible and affordable, while at 
the same time a zero-tolerance approach to corruption is 
enforced. This approach not only encompasses 
deterrence, monitoring, and strict sanctions but also 
incorporates a naming and shaming method that publicly 
exposes the names of individuals implicated in acts of 
corruption.  
Notably, several of the anti-corruption policies 
implemented in Rwanda incorporate behavioural insights. 
In this regard, the Rwandan government has actively 
revived and formalised Rwandan traditional practices in 
many of the major government programmes also known 
as the home-grown solutions (Box 1). Aside from 
improving the lives of Rwandans, these development 
programmes and reforms are behaviourally anchored and 
grounded in practices of sociality by means of which 
traditional Rwandan values of integrity, accountability and 
solidarity are reinstated and diffused. Among Rwandan 
citizens this has come to instil a sense of national pride of 
what could be considered national policy achievements 
‘Made in Rwanda’. It is not coincidental that levels of trust 
towards state actors, especially the office of the 
President, are high in Rwanda. 
Social networks constitute the most salient behavioural 
factor related to sociality that reinforces practices of 
favouritism in Rwanda. Similar to neighbouring Tanzania 
and Uganda, social networks adopt practices that follow 
social norms of reciprocity and moral obligation to the 
group that underpin shared community ideals of social 
justice and group welfare. In the Rwandan context, the 
research suggests that favouritism is the only form of 
petty corruption that is practiced and tolerated among 
network members, although it is mostly limited to family 
and close friends. Other petty corrupt transgressions, 
such as bribery, are increasingly frowned upon.  
 
 
As in the neighbouring countries, network pressures often 
generate conflictive normative pressures for public 
officials who are expected to provide special favours to 
their families but are also nonetheless compelled to 
uphold their official duties particularly given the presence 
of strong vertical monitoring and sanctioning 
mechanisms.  
In order to accommodate both the formal constraints and 
the informal demands placed by social networks, 
Rwandan service providers usually find ways to satisfy the 
needs of their respective social network members that 
would not affect the quality and delivery of services: for 
example, health care providers often attend to the needs 
of close family and friends outside service hours or during 
less busy times.  
 
The evidence provided by the Rwandan case study points 
to two important attributes about social networks that 
have implications for the East African region as a whole: 
firstly, the functionality of extensive social networks is 
Box 1: The Rwandan success story: top-down anti-
corruption mechanisms coupled with development 
programmes formalising social values and traditions 
• Strong top-down anti-corruption mechanisms in the form of a zero-
tolerance approach to corruption include harsh punishments, strong 
monitoring and strict enforcement, but also make use of behavioural 
controls of corruption. For instance, by publishing the names not only 
of the individuals implicated in crimes of corruption but of their 
parents and communities as well, thereby, incorporating 
considerations of social status and shaming into law enforcement. 
• Ubudehe is a traditional Rwandan practice that represented social 
values of compassion and solidarity by means of community activities 
involving assistance to the most needy among community members 
with their day-to-day tasks. Today, the ubudehe social programme 
regulates the categorisation of citizens by income level, whereby the 
poorest receive health benefits for free and other targeted subsidies.  
• Imihigo referred to a traditional practice whereby community members 
would set collective goals to which each individual community 
member would commit and be held accountable for. Imihigo today is a 
key public management instrument in the form of performance 
contracts that reward high performers in service delivery and engages 
community members to realise national development goals.   
• During the kingdom of Rwanda, Itorero was a school of excellence for 
its youth and where a selected few were taught moral and intellectual 
skills. The itorero programme today organises scholarly retreats across 
all strata where values of integrity, creativity and innovation are taught.  
 
Box 2: Behavioural drivers of petty corruption in Rwanda 
• Social network dynamics, based on values of reciprocity and moral 
obligation towards the group, may reproduce the collective practice of 
favouritism among reference networks of family and close friends, but 
not without generating conflicting demands among Rwandan officials 
and service providers. 
• Gift-giving, although socio-culturally prescribed and anchored, remains 
potentially problematic as it may compromise impartial and prompt 
service delivery. 
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correlated with quality of and access to public services. 
Whereas informal social networks in other countries are 
extensive because they constitute an informal social 
safety net in the face of deficient public services, in 
Rwanda social networks need not be built instrumentally 
to compensate for failing state performance. Secondly, 
essential social values and norms that underpin practices 
of the networks can be harnessed to promote better 
social outcomes. Research findings suggest that strongly 
held regards to acts of reciprocity could take a different 
meaning when an individual’s corrupt action can have 
negative consequences for the group. Reciprocity in this 
context keeps people from hurting each other by avoiding 
illegal actions, whereby the culprit in a crime of corruption 
could bring shame and dishonour to family and 
community. 
Gift-giving is another potentially problematic practice that 
is rooted in Rwandan sociality and culture but may 
compromise impartial service delivery. This is mostly due 
to the high ambivalence attached to this practice, which 
traditionally instils a sense of indebtedness by the 
recipient of the gift based on strong norms of reciprocity.  
Policy Recommendations 
On the basis of the empirical research findings, the 
following policy entry points are proposed:  
Testing behavioural approaches to anti-corruption. 
Developing interventions based on the evidence 
concerning behavioural drivers of corruption is a 
promising avenue for complementing conventional anti-
corruption approaches. Such behavioural interventions 
should be conceived to target and even harness the local 
context and understandings - including social norms and 
collective beliefs - which shape incentives, attitudes and 
expectations regarding corruption. Designing anti-
corruption behavioural interventions involves identifying 
shifts (or nudges) in the environment or in the information 
that is shared with individuals that will motivate decision-
making that supports better control of corruption 
outcomes.   
It should be underscored that, although a number of 
behavioural interventions have proven effective in 
experimental settings, the practice of incorporating 
behavioural considerations into policy making to improve 
macro level socio economic outcomes is still very much in 
a nascent stage. There are no blueprints to predicting 
what nudges people will respond to and in what way, 
which means that a) behavioural interventions should be 
rigorously piloted and assessed and b) practitioners 
should be ready to experiment and test different 
approaches to find those most effective in bringing about 
social change in a given context.  
 
Recognising the strong moral imperatives of social 
networks and their role in reproducing favouritism 
Despite strong top-down oversight and monitoring 
mechanisms, favouritism continues to be an issue in the 
health sector due to social norms prescribing the 
obligation to help one’s reference group. Service 
providers, who are located at the crossroads of the formal 
legal order and the informal social normative framework, 
understand and experience first-hand the tensions and 
contradictions that emanate from the demands exerted 
by their social networks. In this regard, the fact that 
favouritism is fuelled by strong expectations about 
obligation and reciprocity can be harnessed to develop 
public educational campaigns that convey the message 
that foregoing social demands of undue preferential 
treatment from service providers is for the benefit of all – 
including the community and family themselves – as 
doing so ensures to protect the reputation and ultimately 
the employment of family members.      
 
Addressing gift-giving  
Gift-giving is another socially grounded practice that can 
become problematic when taking place in contexts of 
public service provision. It should therefore be limited and 
confined to the private sphere. 
 
 
 
 
• Develop and rigorously test pilot behavioural interventions that 
apply different nudges to elicit decision-making that breaks habits 
of corruption and reinforces the sustainability of the gains 
achieved.  
• Support a media ‘edutainment’ campaign that uncovers the 
hidden costs of favouritism and reinforces the recognition that 
public officials cannot use their position to favour anyone 
regardless of feelings of affection, belonging or solidarity. Stories 
could be emphasised where favouritism leads to the guilty 
provider being shamed and losing his/her job and thereby 
inflicting much greater costs on the family in the long-run.  
 
• Educational campaigns could inform citizens that reciprocation in 
the form of gift-giving for a public service they are entitled to as 
Rwandan citizens is not necessary or even potentially harmful. A 
catchy slogan that reinforces the message in the media could be 
complemented by physical symbols at the workplace. For 
example, during an intervention in Serbia, service providers were 
requested to wear pins, which stated “I work for the salary, not for 
the gift!” 
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Revisiting traffic violation regulations 
The research has shown that many traffic violators 
resorted to bribery in order to avoid overly high sanctions 
of minor traffic violations, such as speeding. High fines for 
traffic violations come out strongly as perhaps generating 
unnecessary corruption risks. 
Addressing sexual corruption 
The research findings show that women are particularly 
vulnerable to sexual corruption. Sexual favours can be 
extorted but can also be initiated by females as a 
problem-solving strategy. While it is important to further 
clarify whether in such cases both parties should be 
criminalised, it is of utmost importance to raise 
awareness about the severity and implications of 
engaging in sexual corruption. Such acts could be framed 
as particularly shameful to heighten the social stigma 
associated with such behaviours.  
!
!
!
This document is an output from a project funded by the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) through the 
Research for Evidence Division (RED) for the benefit of 
developing countries. However, the views expressed and 
information contained in it are not necessarily those of or 
endorsed by DFID, which can accept no responsibility for such 
views or information or for any reliance placed on them. The Basel Institute on Governance is an Associated Institute of the 
University of Basel. 
• Consider the revision of fines associated with minor traffic
violations and/or introduce a four-tier system of fines according
to income/ubudehe category. 
• Raise costs – in terms of criminal sanctions and social shaming -
of soliciting or accepting sexual favours on the part of male public
officials.
• Establish safe whistle-blower mechanisms for women to
denounce unwanted sexual advances preferably linked to a
strong, positive female role model.
Lessons for Practitioners 
• The functionality and pragmatic considerations informing the
engagement in corruption as a means to ‘getting things done’ is
irrelevant in a context in which the quality of and access to public
services is adequately ensured. 
• Conflicting normative frameworks, arising from the need to adhere to
formal legal rules and the obligation to fulfil informal social demands
exerted by members of the network, should be acknowledged and
addressed.
• Although gift-giving is a socially-embedded cultural practice, in the
context of the public sector it is inappropriate as it may result in
compromised and impartial service delivery. 
• While social networks relying on norms of reciprocity and moral
obligations to the group can give incentives to engage in corrupt
behaviours such as favouritism; the same network properties may be
harnessed for favourable anti-corruption outcomes.
• The formalisation of social values and traditions ‘Made in Rwanda’ in
development programmes that instil values of integrity, accountability
and solidarity and deter corruption serve as a prominent example to
other African countries.
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